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1.  Introduction 
Subjectivity  and  correlation,  though  formally  related,  are  conceptually 
distinct  and independent  issues. We start  by discussing  subjectivity. 
A mixed  strategy  in a game involves  the selection  of a pure  strategy  by means 
of  a  random  device.  It  has  usually  been  assumed  that  the  random  device  is a 
coin flip, the spin of a roulette  wheel, or something  similar;  in brief,  an ‘objective’ 
device,  one  for  which  everybody  agrees  on  the  numerical  values  of the  proba- 
bilities  involved.  Rather  oddly,  in  spite  of  the  long  history  of  the  theory  of 
subjective  probability,  nobody  seems  to  have  examined  the  consequences  of 
basing  mixed  strategies  on  ‘subjective’  random  devices,  i.e.  devices  on  the 
probabilities  of  whose  outcomes  people  may  disagree  (such  as  horse  races, 
elections,  etc.).  Even  a fairly  superficial  such  examination  yields  some  startling 
results,  as follows : 
(a)  Two-person  zero-sum  games  lose  their  ‘strictly  competitive’  character. 
It  becomes  worthwhile  to  cooperate  in  such  games,  i.e.  to  enter  into  binding 
agreements.’  The  concept  of  the  ‘value’  of  a  zero-sum  game  loses  some  of  its 
force,  since both players  can get more  than  the value (in the utility  sense). 
(b)  In  certain  n-person  games  with  n 2  3 new  equilibrium  points  appear, 
whose payoffs  strictly  dominate  the payoffs  of all other  equilibrium  points.2 
Result  (a) holds  not  just  for  certain  selected  2-person  O-sum games,  but  for 
practically3  all such  games.  Moreover,  it holds  if there  is any  area  whatsoever 
of  subjective  disagreement  between  the  players,  i.e.,  any  event  in  the  world 
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(possibly  entirely  unconnected  with  the  game  under  consideration)  for  which 
players  1 and 2 have different  subjective  probabilities. 
The  phenomenon  enunciated  in  Result  (b) shows  that  not  only  the  2-person 
O-sum theory,  but  also  the  non-cooperative  n-person  theory  is modified  in  an 
essential  fashion  by the introduction  of this new kind  of strategy.  However,  this 
phenomenon  cannot  occur4  for  2-person  games  (zero-sum  or  not);  for  such 
games we will show5 that  the  set of equilibrium  payoff  vectors  is not  changed  by 
the introduction  of subjectively  mixed  strategies. 
We  now  turn  to  correlation.  Correlated  strategies  are  familiar  from  co- 
operative  game theory,  but  their  applications  in non-cooperative  games  are less 
understood.  It  has  been  known  for  some  time  that  by  the  use  of  correlated 
strategies  in  a  non-cooperative  game,  one  can  achieve  as  an  equilibrium  any 
payoff  vector  in the convex  hull  of the mixed  strategy  (Nash)  equilibrium  payoff 
vectors.  Here  we  will  show  that  by  appropriate  methods  of  correlation,  even 
points  outside  of this convex  hull can be achieved.6 
In  describing  these  phenomena,  it is best  to  view a randomized  strategy  as a 
random  variable  with  values  in  the  pure  strategy  space,  rather  than  as  a  dis- 
tribution  over  pure  strategies.  In sect. 3 we develop  such a framework;  it allows 
for  subjectivity,  correlation,  and  all possible  combinations  thereof.  Thus,  a side 
product  of  our  study  is  a  descriptive  theory  (or  taxonomy)  of  randomized 
strategies. 
We are very grateful  to Professors  M. Maschler,  B. Peleg, and R. W. Rosenthal 
for  extremely  stimulating  correspondence  and comments  on this study. 
2.  Examples 
(2.1)  Example.  Consider  the  familiar  two-person  zero-sum  game  ‘matching 
pennies’,  which we write in matrix  form  as follows : 
1,  -1  -1,  1 
-1,  1 
I  1 
1,  -1  - 
Let  D be an event to which players  1 and 2 ascribe  subjective  probability  2/3 and 
l/3  respectively.  Suppose  now  that  the  players  bindingly  agree  to  the  following 
pair  of  strategies:  Player  2 will play  left  in any  event;  player  1 will play  top  if 
D  occurs,  and  bottom  otherwise.  The  expectation  of  both  players  is then  l/3, 
whereas  the value  of the game is of course  0 to both  players. 
To make this example  work,  one needs an event  D whose subjective  probability 
is  >  l/2  for  one  player  and  <  l/2  for  the  other.  Such  an  event  can  always  be 
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constructed  as long  as the  players  disagree  about  something,  i.e.,  there  is some 
event  B  with  p,(B)  #  p,(B)  (where  pi  is the  subjective  probability  of  i).  For 
example,  if p,(B)  =  718  and  p2(B)  =  518, then  we  can  construct  the  desired 
event  by  tossing  a  fair  coin  twice  (provided  these  particular  coin  tosses  were 
not  involved  in the  description  of B);  if C is the  event  ‘at least  one  head’,  then 
we  have  p,(B  n  C)  =  21/32  >  l/2  >  15/32 =  p,(B  n  C).  This  kind  of  con- 
struction  can always be carried  out  (see the proof  of Proposition  5.1). 
(2.2)  Example.  Suppose  that  there  is an  event  D  to  which  players  1 and  2 
ascribe  subjective  probabilities  1 and  0 respectively  and  such that  only  player  1 
is informed  before  the play as to whether  or not  D occurs.  Consider  the following 
pair  of  strategies:  Player  2 plays  left;  player  1 plays  top  if  D  occurs,  bottom 
otherwise.  This  strategy  yields  a  payoff  of  (1, 1);  moreover,  it  is  actually  in 
equilibrium,  in  the  sense  that  neither  player  has  any  incentive  to  carry  out  a 
unilateral  change  in  strategy.  However,  it  has  a  somewhat  degenerate  flavor, 
since  it  requires  that  at  least  one  of  the  two  players  be certain  of  a falsehood 
(see  sect.  8).  We  now  show  that  a  similar  phenomenon  can  also  occur  in  a 
non-degenerate  set-up;  but it requires  3 players. 
(2.3)  Example.  Consider  the three-person  game given as follows : 
mp:::p  y-E-j 
here  player  1 picks  the  row,  player  2 the  column,  and  player  3 the  matrix.  A 
triple  of objectively  mixed  strategies  is an equilibrium  point  in this game  if and 
only  if player  1 plays  bottom  and  player  2 plays  left;  player  3 may  play  any 
mixed  strategy.  All  these  equilibrium  points  have  the  same  payoff  vector, 
namely  (1, 1, 1). Suppose  now  that  D  is  an  event  to  which  players  1 and  2 
ascribe  subjective  probabilities  3/4  and  l/4  respectively,  and  such  that  only 
player  3 is  informed  as  to  whether  or  not  D  occurs.  Consider  the  following 
strategy  triple:  player  1 plays  top;  player  2 plays  right;  player  3 chooses  the left 
matrix  if  D  occurs,  the  right  matrix  if not.  If player  1 moves  down  he will get 
l/4.8  =  2 rather  than  1.3  =  3 ; similarly  for  player  2 if he  moves  left;  as for 
player  3, he certainly  cannot  profit  from  moving,  since he is getting  his maximum 
payoff  in  the  whole  game.  Therefore  this  is an  equilibrium  point;  its payoff  is 
(3, 3, 3), instead  of the (1, 1, 1) obtained  at all objective  equilibrium  points. 
That  this  kind  of  phenomenon  cannot  occur  with  fewer  than  3 players  will 
be shown  in sect. 5. 
An  interesting  feature  of  this  example  is that  the  higher  payoff  at  the  new, 
subjective,  equilibrium  point  is not  only  ‘subjectively  higher’,  it  is ‘objectively 
higher’.  That  is, unlike  the  case  in  Example  2.1, the  payoff  is higher  not  only 70  R.J.  Aumann,  Randomized  strategies 
because  of  the  differing  probability  estimates  of  the  players,  but  it  is  higher  in 
any  case,  whether  or  not  the  event  D  takes  place.  The  contribution  of  subjective 
probabilities  in  this  case  is  to  make  the  new  point  an  equilibrium;  once  chosen, 
it  is  sure  to  make  all  the  players  better  off  than  at  any  of  the  old  equilibrium 
points. 
We  remark  that  by  using  different  numbers  we  can  find  similar  examples 
based  on  arbitrarily  small  probability  differences. 
It  is  essential  in  this  example  that  only  player  3 be  informed  as  to  whether  or 
not  D  occurs.  If,  say,  player  1 were  also  informed  (before  the  time  comes  for 
choosing  his  pure  strategy),  he  could  do  better  by  playing  top  or  bottom  accord- 
ing  as  to  whether  D  occurs  or  not.  7 This  secrecy  regarding  D  is  quite  natural. 
If we were  to  insist  that  all  players  be  informed  about  D, it would  be like  insisting 
that  in  an  objectively  mixed  strategy  based  on  a coin  toss,  all  players  be informed 
as  to  the  outcome  of  the  toss.  But  much  of  the  effectiveness  of  mixed  strategies 
is  based  precisely  on  the  secrecy,  which  would  then  be  destroyed.  In  practical 
situations,  it  is  of  course  quite  common  for  some  players  to  have  differing  sub- 
jective  probabilities  for  events  about  which  they  are  not  informed,  and  on  which 
other  players  peg  their  strategy  choices. 
Our  last  6 examples  deal  with  correlation. 
(2.4)  Example.  Consider  the  following  familiar  2-person  non-zero-sum  game  : 
There  are  exactly  3 Nash  equilibrium  points:  2 in  pure  strategies,  yielding  (2,  1) 
and  (1,  2)  respectively,  and  one  in  mixed  strategies,  yielding  (2/3,  2/3).  The 
payoff  vector  (3/2,  3/2)  is  not  achievable  at  all  in  (objectively)  mixed  strategies. 
It  is,  however,  achievable  in  ‘correlated’  strategies,  as  follows:  One  fair  coin  is 
tossed;  if it  falls  heads,  players  1 and  2 play  top  and  left  respectively;  otherwise, 
they  play  bottom  and  right. 
The  interesting  aspect  of this  procedure  is that  it not  only  achieves  (3/2,3/2),  it 
is  also  in  equilibrium  ; neither  player  can  gain  by  a unilateral  change.  Any  point 
in  the  convex  hull  of the  Nash  equilibrium  payoffs  of  any  game  can  be  achieved 
in  a similar  fashion,  and  will  also  be  in  equilibrium.  This  is not  new;  it  has  been 
in  the  folklore  of  game  theory  for  years.  I  believe  the  first  to  notice  this  pheno- 
menon  (at  least  in  print)  were  Harsanyi  and  Selten  (1972). 
In  the  following  4 examples  we wish  to  point  out  a phenomenon  that  we believe 
is new,  namely  that  by  the  use  of  correlated  strategies  one  can  achieve  a payoff 
vector  that  is  in  equilibrium  in  the  same  sense  as  above,  but  that  is  outside the 
‘I am grateful to R.W. Rosenthal for this remark. R.J.  Aumann, Randomized  strategies  71 
convex  hull  of  the  Nash  equilibrium  payoffs.  In  fact,  except  in  Example  2.7,  it  is 
better  for  all  players  than  any  Nash  equilibrium  payoff. 
(2.5)  Example.  Consider  the  3-person  game  given  as follows  : 
mi  !::i:$::::~  ~z$~:~  * 
Here  player  1 picks  the  row,  player  2  the  column,  and  player  3 the  matrix.  If 
we  restrict  ourselves  to  pure  strategies,  there  are  only  3  equilibrium  payoffs, 
namely  (0,  0,  0),  (1,  0,  0),  and  (0,  1, 0).  If  we allow  (objectively)  mixed  strategies, 
some  more  equilibrium  payoffs  are  added,  but  none  of their  coordinates  exceed  1. 
Consider  now  the  following  strategy  triple:  Player  3  plays  the  middle  matrix. 
Players  1 and  2 get  together  and  toss  a fair  coin,  but  do  not  inform  player  3 of 
the  outcome  of  the  toss.  If  the  coin  falls  on  heads,  players  1 and  2 play  top  and 
left  respectively;  otherwise,  they  play  bottom  and  right  respectively.  The  payoff 
is (2,2,2).  If player  3 would  know  the  outcome  of the  toss,  he would  be  tempted 
to  move  away;  for  example,  if  it  was  heads,  he  would  move  left.  Since  he  does 
not  know,  he would  lose  by  moving.  Thus  the  introduction  of correlation  among 
subsets of the  players  can  significantly  improve  the  payoff  to  everybody. 
(2.6)  Example.  Another  version  of Example  2.5  is the  following: 
This  version  has  the  advantage  that  there  is  only  one  Nash  equilibrium  payoff, 
namely  (1,  1, 1);  and  it  can  be  read  off  from  the  matrices  by  the  use  of  simple 
domination  arguments,  as  compared  to  the  slightly  laborious  computations 
needed  in  the  previous  example.  The  advantage  of  Example  2.5  is  that  the  new 
rorrelated  strategy  equilibrium  point  has  the  property  that  any  deviation  will 
>ctually  lead  to  a loss  (not  only  a failure  to  gain). 
In  both  examples,  player  3 will  not  even  want to  know  the  outcome  of the  toss; 
he  will  want players  1 and  2 to  perform  it  in  secret.  It  is important  for  him  that 
players  1 and  2 know  that  he  does  not  know  the  outcome  of  the  toss;  otherwise 
they  cannot  depend  on  him  to  choose  the  middle  matrix,  and  will  in  consequence 
themselves  play  for  an  equilibrium  point  that  is  less  advantageous  for  all.  Thus 
in  Example  2.6,  player  3 knows  that  if  he  can  ‘peep’,  then  players  1 and  2 will 
necessarily  play  bottom  and  left  respectively,  to  the  mutual  disadvantage  of  all. 
(2.7)  Example.  In  Examples  2.5  and  2.6,  equilibrium  payoffs  outside  of  the 
convex  hull  of  the  Nash  equilibrium  payoffs  were  achieved  by  ‘partial’  correla- 72  R.J.  Aumann, Randomized  strategies 
tion  -  correlation  of  strategy  choices  by  2  out  of  the  3 players.  We  now  show 
that  a similar  phenomenon  can  occur  even  in  2-person  games;  here  again  a kind 
of partial  correlation  is used,  but  it is subtler  than  that  appearing  previously. 
Consider  the  2-person  game  given  as follows  : 
This  game  has  two  pure  strategies  equilibrium  points,  with  payoff  (2,  7)  and 
(7,  2)  respectively,  and  one  mixed  strategy  equilibrium  point,  with  payoff 
(4$,4$).  Consider  now  an  objective  chance  mechanism  that  chooses  one  of three 
points  A,  B,  C  with  probability  l/3  each.  After  the  point  has  been  chosen, 
player  1 is told  whether  or  not  A  was  chosen,  and  player  2 is told  whether  or  not 
C  was  chosen;  nothing  more  is  told  to  the  players.  Consider  the  following  pair 
of  strategies:  If  he  is  informed  that  A  was  chosen,  player  1 plays  his  bottom 
strategy;  otherwise,  his  top  strategy.  Similarly,  if  he  is  informed  that  C  was 
chosen,  player  2 plays  his  right  strategy;  otherwise,  he goes  left.  It  is easy  to  verify 
that  this  pair  of  strategies  is indeed  in  equilibrium,  and  that  it  yields  the  players 
an  expectation  of  (5,5)  -  a  payoff  that  is  outside  the  convex  hull  of  the  Nash 
equilibrium  payoffs  (listed  above). 
The  strategies  in  this  equilibrium  point  are  not  stochastically  independent, 
like  the  mixed  or  pure  strategies  appearing  in  Nash  equilibrium  points,  nor  are 
they  totally  correlated,  like  the  strategies  appearing  in  Example  2.4.  It  is 
precisely  the  partial  correlation  that  enables  the  phenomenon  we  observe  here. 
(2.8)  Example.  Consider  the  2-person  game  given  as follows: 
7,2  0,  3  0,o  “~ 
This  is obtained  from  the  previous  example  by  adding  a middle  row  and  a middle 
column,  with  appropriate  payoffs.  The  strategy  pairs  (top,  right)  and  (bottom, 
left),  which  previously  yielded  the  equilibrium  payoffs  (2,  7)  and  (7,2),  are  no 
longer  in  equilibrium;  the  equilibrium  property  has  been  ‘killed’  by  the  addition 
of  the  new  strategies.  The  mixed-strategy  pair  which  previously  yielded  (43,4$) 
remains  in  equilibrium  here;  moreover  we  get  a  new  pure  strategy  equilibrium 
point  yielding  (4,4),  and  a  new  mixed  strategy  equilibrium  point  yielding 
(2$$,  2%).  These  are  all  the  Nash  equilibrium  payoffs.  Thus  we  see that  43 is the 
maximum  that  either  player  can  get  at  any  Nash  equilibrium  point. 
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2.7  remains  in  equilibrium  here,  and  yields  (5,  5) -  more,  for  both  players,  than 
that  yielded  by  any  of the  Nash  equilibria. 
Though  the  random  device  needed  in  Examples  2.7  and  2.8  is  conceptually 
somewhat  more  complex  than  the  coin  tosses  (secret  or  joint)  used  in  classical 
game  theory  and  in  Examples  2.4,  2.5,  and  2.6,  it  is  not  at  all  difficult  to  con- 
struct.  Given  a roulette  wheel,  it  is easy  to  attach  electrical  connections  that  will 
do  the  job.  If the  reader  wishes,  he  can  think  of the  players  as jointly  supervising 
the  construction  of  the  device,  and  then  retiring  to  separate  rooms  to  get  the 
information  and  choose  their  strategies.  It  is  advantageous  for  both  players  to 
build  the  device,  to  satisfy  each  other  that  it  is  working  properly,  and  then  to 
follow  the  above  procedure.  Once  chosen,  the  procedure  is  of  course  self- 
enforcing;  neither  player  will  wish  to  renege  at  any  stage. 
(2.9)  Example.  Consider  again  the  2-person  O-sum  game  ‘matching  pennies’ 
already  treated  in  Example  2.1.  Suppose  that  nature  chooses  one  of  four  points 
A,  B, C,  or  D,  and  that  players  1  and  2  ascribe  to  these  choices  subjective 
probabilities  (l/3,  l/6,  l/6,  l/3)  and  (l/6,  l/3,  l/3,  l/6),  respectively.  Under  no 
condition  is  either  player  told  which  point  was  chosen,  but  player  1  is  told 
whether  the  point  chosen  is in  {A,  B} or  in  {C,  D},  and  player  2 is told  whether 
the  point  chosen  is in  {A,  C}  or  in  {B, D}.  Consider  the  following  strategy  pair: 
Player  1 chooses  top  or  bottom  according  as  to  whether  he  is  told  ‘{A,  B}’  or 
‘{C,  D>‘;  player  2  chooses  left  or  right  according  as  to  whether  he  is  told 
‘{A,  C}’  or  ‘{B,  D}‘.  Like  the  strategy  pair  in  Example  2.1,  this  yields  each 
player  an  expectation  of  l/3,  whereas  the  value  of  the  game  is  of  course  0  to 
both  players;  unlike  the  strategy  pair  of Example  2.1,  this pair  is in equilibrium. 
If,  in  a  2-person  zero-sum  game  with  value  V, we  permit  correlation  but  rule 
out  subjectivity,  then  the  payoffs  to  all  strategy  pairs  continue  to  sum  to  0, and  it 
is  easy  to  see  that  the  only  equilibrium  points  have  payoffs  (u,  -0).  If  we  rule 
out  correlation  (i.e.  permit  mixed  or  pure  strategies  only)  but  permit  subjectivity, 
we  still  get  only  (0,  -  u) as  an  equilibrium  payoff;  this  follows  from  Proposition 
5.1.  But  if we  permit  both  subjectivity  and  correlation,  then  this  example  shows 
that  there  may  exist  mutually  advantageous  equilibrium  points,  even  in  2- 
person  O-sum  games. 
3.  The  formal  model 
In  this  section,  definitions  are  indicated  by  italics. 
A game  consists  of: 
(1)  a finite  set  N(thepZayers);  write  N  =  (1,  . . ., n); 
(2)  for  each  i E N, a finite  set  Si (the  pure strategies  of i); 
(3)  a finite  set  X(the  outcomes); 
(4)  a  function  g  from  the  Cartesian  product  S  =  x isnSi  onto  X  (the  outcome 
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This  completes  the  description  of  the  game  as  such;  formally,  however,  we  still 
need  some  equipment  for  randomizing  strategies,  and  for  defining  utilities  and 
subjective  probabilities  for  the  players.  Thus  to  the  description  of  the  game  we 
append  the  following: 
(5)  A  set  !2  (the  states  of  the world),  together  with  a  o-field  29 of  subsets  of  C? 
(the  ecents) ; 
(6)  For  each  player  i, a sub-o-field  Yi  of 39 (the  events  in  pi  are  those  regarding 
which i is informed). 
(7)  For  each  player  i, a  relation  ki  (the  preference  order  of  i)  on  the  space  of 
lotteries  on  the  outcome  space  X,  where  a  lottery on  Xis  a  .%Y-measurable’ 
function  from  Q to  X. 
The  intuitive  scenario  associated  with  this  model  involves  the  following  steps, 
to be  thought  of as  occurring  one  after  the  other  as follows: 
(i)  Nature  chooses  a point  w in  a. 
(ii)  Each  player  i is informed  as to  which  events  in  pi  contain  CD. 
(iii)  Each  player  i chooses  9 a pure  strategy  Si in  Si . 
(iv)  The  outcome  is determined”  to  be  g(sr , . . ., s,). 
Returning  to  the  formal  model,  let  us  define  a randomized  strategy  (or  simply 
strategy)  for  player  i to  be  a  measurable  function  si  from  (Q,  4,)  to  Si.  Note 
that  si  must  be  measurable  w.r.t.  (with  respect  to)  pi,  not  merely  w.r.t.  37’; this 
means  that  i can  peg  his  strategies  only  on  events  regarding  which  he is informed. 
[In  the  above  scenario,  strategies  are  chosen  before  step  (ii).] 
Ifs  is  an  n-tuple  of  strategies,  then  g(s)  is  a lottery  on  X.  An  equiZibrium  point 
is  an  n-tuple  s  =  (sr , . . ., s,)  of  strategies  such  that  for  all  i and  all  strategies  ci 
of  i, we have 
g(s)  Xi  g(sl  9  *  *  *I  si-l  3  ti,  si+l  7  .  *  -9  sn>* 
We  will  assume  : 
Assumption  1.  For  each  i, there  is a real  function  ui  on  X (the  utility function 
of  i)  and  a  probability  measure”  pi  on  R  (the  subjectice  probability  of  i)  such 
that  for  all  lotteries  x  and  y  on  X, we  have 
x  kiyifandonlyif 
g ui(x(m))  dPi(m)  2  S,ui(Y(w))  dPi(w); 
moreover,  pi is unique.r2 
8This means  that  for each  x E X, the set  {x =  x} [i.e. the set  {w:x(w)  =  x}] is in 9. 
9Without  informing  the  other  players. 
“‘Note  that  g does  not  depend  on w; see subsect.  d) of sect.  9. 
“~-additive  non-negative  measure  withp@)  =  1. 
I21 e  if (u,‘, pi’)  also  satisfy  the  condition  of  the  previous  sentence,  then  p,’  =  p,.  Axiom  . . 
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This  assumption  says  that  player  i’s preferences  between  lotteries  are  governed 
by  the  expected  utility  of  the  outcomes  of  the  lotteries.  There  are  well  known 
systems  of  axioms  on  the  preferences  &  that  lead  to  utilities  and  subjective 
probabilities;  see  for  example  Savage  (1954)  or  Anscombe  and  Aumann  (1963). 
Note  that  pi  is defined  on  all  of ~8, not  only  on  .Yi ; that  is,  i assigns  a proba- 
bility  to  all  events,  not  only  those  regarding  which  i is informed. 
Two  events  A  and  B are  i-independent  if 
Pi(A  n  B)  =  Pi(A) 
intuitively,  this  means  that  i can  get  no  hint  about  A  from  information  regarding 
B.  More  generally,  the  events  A,,  . . ., A,  are  i-independent  if 
pi(B,  n  . . . n  &)  =  Pi(B1)  - - -Pi(&) 
whenever  each  Bj  is either  Aj  or Q.  Events  are  independent  if they  are  i-indepen- 
dent  for  all  i. An  event  is  i-secret  if  it  is  in  $i,  and  for  each  j  other  than  i, it  is 
j-independent  of  all  events  in  the  a-field  generated  by  all  the  9,  with  k  #  i. 
Thus  i is informed  regarding  each  i-secret  event,  but  players  other  than  i can  get 
no  hint  of  it,  even  by  pooling  their  knowledge.  The  family  of  i-secret  events  is 
denoted  Yi.  We  assume 
Assumption  II.  For  each  i,  there  is  a  a-field  WI  of  i-secret  events  such  that 
each  pi  is non-atomic  on  pi. 
Intuitively,  Wi  can  be  constructed  from  a  roulette  spin  conducted  by  i  in 
secret.  To  obtain  the  non-atomicity,  it  is  sufficient  to  assume  that  each  player  j 
assigns  subjective  probability  0  to  each  particular  outcome;13  or  equivalently, 
that  there  exist  finite  partitions  of  0  into  Wi-events  whose  pj-probabilities  are 
arbitrarily  small.  Such  non-atomicity  assumptions  are  familiar  in  treatments  of 
subjective  probability.  l4  Note  that  the  roulette  wheel  need  not  be  ‘objective’, 
i.e.  the  players  may  disagree  about  the  probabilities  involved. 
A  strategy  si  of  i is mixed  if it  is Yi-measurable,  i.e.  pegged  on  i-secret  events. 
Strategies  sl,  . . ., s, are  uncorrelated  if  for  each  s E S,  the  n  events  {sj  =  sj}  are 
independent.  Mixed  strategies  are  uncorrelated,  but  the  converse  is  false; 
strategies  may  be  uncorrelated  even  though  they  are  pegged  on  events  regarding 
which  all  players  are  informed. 
An  event  A  is  called  objective  if  all  the  subjective  probabilities  p,(A)  coincide; 
in  that  case  their  common  value  is  called  the  probability  of  A,  and  is  denoted 
if we  had  wanted  to  minimize  our  assumptions  we could  have  avoided  assuming  uniqueness, 
at  this  stage.  Indeed,  the  uniqueness  of  pi  follows  from  the  exisrence  of  a  non-atomic  pi; 
and  this  is assumed  in  Assumption  II.  It  is,  however,  more  convenient  to  assume  uniqueness 
already  at  this  stage,  since  it enables  us to  refer  immediately  to  ‘the’ subjective  probability  of 
player  i, and  this simplifies  the entire  discussion. 
13The set of outcomes  is taken  to be the unit interval  (nor {0,  1, . . ., 36)). 
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p(A).  A strategy  sI of i is called  objective  if it is pegged  on objective  events,  i.e. if 
{Si =  Si} is  an  objective  event  for  all  si E Si.  The  strategies  occurring  in  the 
classical  non-cooperative  theory  are  precisely  those  that  are  both  objective 
and  mixed. 
An event  or strategy  is called subjective  if it is not  objective. 
The  preference  order  of  i determines  his utility  function  on  X only  up  to  a 
monotonic  linear  transformation.  Given  a  specific  choice  ul,  . . ., u,  of  utility 
functions  of the  players,  define  the payofffunction  of player  i in the  usual  way; 
that  is, ifs  is an n-tuple  of pure  strategies  (i.e. s E S), define 
and if s is an n-tuple  of arbitrary  strategies,  define 
(3.1)  Hi(s)  =  Ei(hi(s))  =  ihi(s(w))  dPi(w), 
E,  being  the  expectation  operator  w.r.t.  the  probability  measure  pi  on Sz. Then 
g(s)  >  i g(l) if and only if Hi(s)  >  Hi(t).  Write 
h =  (hl,  . . ., h,), 
H=  (H,,...,H,). 
Any vector  of the form  H(s) is called  a,feasiblepayofS;  ifs  is an equilibrium  point, 
then  H(s)  is  called  an  equilibrium  payofi  and  if  s is  an  equilibrium  point  in 
objective  mixed  strategies,  then  H(s)  is an objective  mixed  equilibrium  payoff. 
To orient  the reader,  we mention  that  Example  2.1 involves  a pair  of subjective 
strategies  that  is not  in  equilibrium;  Examples  2.2 and  2.3 involve  equilibrium 
points  in  mixed  subjective  strategies;  and  Examples  2.4  through  2.8  involve 
equilibrium  points  that  are  objective,  but  are  not  in  mixed  strategies  (the 
strategies  are in fact  correlated,  i.e. not  uncorrelated). 
4.  Preliminaries  and generalities 
This  section  is  devoted  to  the  statement  of  several  lemmas  needed  in  the 
sequel,  of an existence  theorem  for equilibrium  points  (Proposition  4.3), and of a 
proposition  concerning  the nature  of the sets of feasible  and equilibrium  payoffs. 
We also discuss the  notion  of ‘correlation’. 
Though  most  of the  results  stated  in this  section  are  intuitively  unsurprising, 
the  proofs  are  a little  involved  (because  of the  relatively  weak  assumptions  we 
have  made).  We  therefore  postpone  these  proofs  to  sect.  7,  in  order  to  get  as 
quickly  as  possible  to  the  conceptually  more  interesting  results  of  the  paper 
(Propositions  5.1 and  6.1). Readers  who  are interested  only  in the  statements  of 
these propositions  (as opposed  to the proofs)  may  skip this section. 
The first lemma  asserts  that  objective  mixed  strategies  can be constructed  with 
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model  as  well.  Define  a  distribution  on  S,  to  be  a  real-valued  function  on  Si 
whose values are non-negative  and sum to  1. 
(4.1)  Lemma.  Let  i E N,  and  let  ai  be  a  distribution  on  Si.  Then  i  has  an 
objective mixed  strategy  si such that for  all si E Si, 
p(Si  =  Si>  =  bi(Si)* 
Next,  we have 
(4.2)  Lemma.  For any  i in N,  any event B,  and any  u between  0 and  1, there 
is an objective i-secret event with probability  CL  that is independent of B. 
Intuitively,  Lemmas  4.1  and  4.2  depend  on  the  existence  of  an  objective 
roulette  wheel  that  i  can  spin  in  secret.  Thus  they  appear  to  go  somewhat 
further15  than  Assumption  II,  and it is of some interest  that  in fact,  they  follow 
from  it. 
The  next  proposition  asserts  that  the  classical  equilibrium  points  of  Nash 
(1951) appear  in this model  as well. If c  =  (aI,  . . ., a,)  is an n-tuple  of distribu- 
tions  on S1, . . ., S,  respectively,  and if i E N, define 
F,(a)  =  ~~hi(s)~j,N~j(Sj) 3 
where  the sum runs  over all pure  strategy  n-tuples  s =  (sl,  . . ., s,). The payoflto 
o is the  n-tuple  F(o)  =  (FI(o),  . . ., F,,(o)).  Recall  that  r~ is a  Nash  equilibrium 
point  if for  any i and any distribution  Zi on Si, we have 
Fi(g)  2  Fi(a,  3 . . -9  ci-13  bi+lp  . * 03  an); 
in that  case F(o) is called a Nash equilibriumpayoff. 
(4.3)  Proposition.  The set  of  Nash  equilibrium  payoffs  coincides  with  the set 
of objective  mixed  equilibrium payo#s. 
From  this  proposition  and  Nash’s  theorem  it follows  immediately  that  there 
is an equilibrium  point  in every  game. 
We now  come  to  the  concept  of correlation.  Set S,  =  AisN~i ; the  members 
of  S,  are called public  events. A continuous chance device, or  roulette for  short, 
is a sub-o-field  W of R  on  which  each pi  is non-atomic;  if W consists  of public 
events,  it is called apublic  roulette. 
Parallel  to Lemma  4.2, we have 
(4.4)  Lemma.  Assume  that  there  is  a public  roulette.  Then for  any  event  B, 
and any c1  between 0 and 1, there  is an objective public  event  with probability  ~1 
that is independent of B. 
A  public  roulette  can  be used as a correlating  device  on which  all players  can 
peg their  choices;  this leads (cf. Example  2.4) to 
1  ?ke subsection  e) of sect.  9 for a discussion  of this  point. 
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(4.5)  Proposition.  Assume  that  there  is  a  public  roulette.  Then  the  set  of 
equilibrium payoffs  and the set offeasible  payoffs are both convex. 
It  is  not  known  whether  the  set  of  equilibrium-or  feasible-payoffs  is 
closed,  whether  or  not  one  assumes  the  existence  of a public  roulette. 
Public  roulettes  enable  all players  to  correlate  their  strategies,  as  in  Example 
2.4.  In  Examples  2.5 through  2.9,  the  correlation  is of a subtler  kind.  To  describe 
the  situation,  let  us  call  the  triple  consisting  of  the  pair  (Q,  &?), the  n-tuple 
(4  1 . . ., 9,),  and  the  n-tuple  (pi,  . . ., p,)  a  randomizing  structure.  In  Examples 
2.4,  2.5,  and  2.6,  the  randomizing  structure  is  of  a  particularly  simple  kind, 
which  we  call  standard, and  which  is  described  as  follows: 
For  each  T  c  N, let JT be  a copy  of the  unit  interval  [0,  l]  with  the  Bore1  sets. 
Let  (Q  g)  =  x TcNJT,  and  let  7cT  be  the  projection  of Q  on  JT.  For  i in  iV, call 
two  members  o1  and  w2 of Q i-equivalent if nT(W1)  =  7+(w2)  for  all  Tcontaining 
i. Let  .YI be  the  a-field  of  all  events  in  R  that  are  unions  of  i-equivalence  classes. 
Let  all  the pi  be  Lebesgue  measure  on  Q. 
Intuitively,  the  points  of  J,  are  outcomes  of  an  objective  roulette  spin  con- 
ducted  in  the  presence  of  the  members  of  T only.  Note  that  all  the  probabilities 
are  the  same,  so  that  subjectivity  does  not  enter  the  picture.  Even  in  this 
relatively  simple  case,  though,  it  is  not  clear  that  the  set  of  equilibrium  payoffs 
is  closed  (it  is  convex  by  Proposition  4.5).  However,  when  n  =  2  and  the 
randomizing  structure  is  standard,  then  it  is  easily  verified  that  the  set  of 
equilibrium  payoffs  is  precisely  the  convex  hull  of  the  Nash  equilibrium  payoffs. 
In  Example  2.7,the  randomizing  structure  is not  standard  ; but  the probabilities 
are  objective,  i.e.  all  the  p,  coincide.  It  is easily  verified  that  whenever  the  proba- 
bilities  are  objective  and  there  is  a  public  roulette,  the  set  of  feasible  payoffs  is 
simply  the  convex  hull  of the  pure  strategy  payoffs.  In  particular,  this  will  be  the 
case  when  the  randomizing  structure  is standard. 
5.  Equilibrium  points  in two-person  games 
In  Example  2.3  we  showed  that  by  pegging  strategies  on  subjective  events,  it is 
possible  to  find  a  3-person  game  with  an  equilibrium  point  in  mixed  strategies 
whose  payoff  is  higher  for  all  players  than  the  payoff  to  any  equilibrium  in 
objective  mixed  strategies.  In  this  section  we show  that  this  cannot  happen  in  the 
case  of 2-person  games. 
(5.1)  Proposition.  Let  G be a 2-person  game,16  and assume  that 
(5.2)  for  any event B, pi(B)  =  0 if and only ifp,(B)  =  0. 
Then  for  each  equilibrium  point  s  in  mixed  strategies,  there  is  an  equilibrium 
point  t in objective mixed  strategies  such that H(s)  =  H(t). 
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Proof  Let  (Q,  s2) be an equilibrium  point  in mixed  strategies.  Let  t,  be an 
objective  mixed  strategy  for  player  1 that  mimics  the  way player  2 sees sl,  i.e., 
such that  for  all pure  strategies  s1 of player  1, 
(5.3)  &l  =  %> = P2{% =  $11; 
such  a  strategy  exists  because  of  Lemma  4.1.  Similarly,  let  tz  be  an  objective 
mixed  strategy  for player  2 such that for all s2, 
(5.4)  Pit,  =  sz}  =p1{s,  =  sz}. 
Let  s~~,s~~,  . . .  be  the  pure  strategies  that  enter  actively  into  sl,  i.e.,  with 
positive  p,-probability.  Because s1 is in equilibrium, 
(5.5)  Elhl(Slj,  $2)  =  Hl(s13  s2) 
for  allj.  But from  (5.2) it follows  that  the Slj are also precisely  the pure  strategies 
that  enter  actively  into  t,  ; hence  (5.5) yields 
(5.6)  Hi@, , sz> =  fG@, 3  4. 
Since s1 maximizes  Hi  (if 2 plays sZ), it follows  from  (5.6) that  t,  also does.  But 
by (5.4), player  1 ascribes the  same distribution  to t,  as to s2 ; therefore 
&(G,  tz)  =  K(t,,  SZ) =  K(%,  SZ), 
and furthermore,  i,  maximizes  Hi  if 2 plays t2.  Similarly, 
and  t,  maximizes  H,  if  1 plays  t, . Therefore  (tr , tJ  is  an  objective  mixed 
equilibrium  point  with the same payoff  as (sl,  sz), and the proof  of this proposi- 
tion  is complete. 
It would  have been reasonable  to conjecture  that  this proposition  remains  true 
if both  occurrences  of the word  ‘mixed’ are deleted.  Example  2.9 shows that  this 
is false. 
6.  Two-person  zero-sum  games 
A  game  is  called  2-person  O-sum if  n  =  2  and  if  there  are  utility  functions 
u1 and u2 for the players  such that 
u,(x)+u,(x)  =  0 
for  all x E X. After  adopting  a specific such pair  of utility  functions,  one  defines 
the  value  of the  game  as usual.  Specifically,  Proposition  4.3 provides  an equili- 
brium  point  in  objective  mixed  strategies;  by  the  minimax  theorem,  all  such 
equilibrium  points  must  have  the  same  payoff,  which  is  of  the  form  (v, -u). 
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(6.1)  Proposition.  Let  G be  a 2-person  O-sum game  with value v. Assume 
(6.2)  There  are  outcomes  x  and y  with q(x)  >  v >  ul(y). 
(6.3)  For  each  player  i,  there  is  a  subjective  event  B,  regarding  which  i  is 
informed. 
Then  there  is a pair  s of strategies  such  that 
(6.4)  H,(s)  >  v, H&)  >  -v. 
Remark.  The  proposition  is  considerably  easier  to  prove  if one  assumes  that 
(6.5)  there  is a public  subjective  event  B and  there  is a public  roulette, 
To  see this,  assume  without  loss  of generality  that 
PI(B)  >  P,(B) 
(otherwise,  use  the  complement  of  B).  If  C  is  a  public  event  and  0  5  8  s  1, 
denote  by  9C  a public  event  such  that 
plW)  =  OPT  and  p2W)  =  OPT; 
the  existence  of  such  a  BC  follows”  from  Lemma  4.4.  From  (6.2)  it  follows 
that  there  is a fl with  0  <  p  <  1 such  that 
v  =  Pur(x)+(l  -P)%(Y). 
ForO<Jc  l,set 
Bd =  Cl\~(Cl\B). 
Then  for  6  sufficiently  small,  we  have  pl(Bg)  >  p2(B6)  >  p;  hence  if  we  let 
A  =  8B’  for  an  appropriate  0, then 
(6.6)  PI(A)  >  B  ’  PZ(A)- 
Now  define  s as  follows:  Both  players  choose  pure  strategies  leading  to  x,  or 
both  players  use  pure  strategies  leading  to  y,  according  as to  whether  A does  or 
does  not  occur.  Then  (6.4)  follows,  and  the  proposition  is  proved  under  the 
assumption  of  (6.5). 
Proof  of Proposition 6.1.  In  (6.2),  let  x  =  g(r,  , rJ  and  y  I  g(tl  , tz);  then 
hl(rl,  rz)  >  0 >  WI,  tJ. 
Suppose  first  that  hl(rl  , tz)  2  u. Setting 
H*(s)  =  ah&,  r2) + (1 --4hkl,  tz> 
H&)  =  h(fl,  rJ  + Cl-  4hl(tl,  t,>, 
171t also  follows  from  the  theorem  of  Lyapunov  (1940)  on  the  range  of  a vector  measure 
We shall  see in sect.  8 that  Proposition  4.4 is itself  proved  via Lyapunov’s  theorem;  intuitively’ 
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we find that  for E >  0 sufficiently  small, 
H*(E)  >  0 >  H*(E). 
Hence  there  is a B in [0, I] with 
1)  =  /3H*(E)+(1 -fi)H*(&). 
Now  let A, be a subjective  event  in Y1 withp,(A,)  >  p  > p&4,).  The  existence 
of such an event  may  be established  as in the remark  [cf. (6.6)], except  that  now 
the  mapping  C -+ 8C  takes  9,  into  itself  (rather  than  91  n  $z  into  itself), 
Lemma  4.2  (rather  than  4.4)  is used  to  prove  the  existence  of  BC, and  B,  is 
substituted  for  B. Again  using Lemma  4.2, we obtain  an objective  2-secret  event 
AZ with  probability  E that  is independent  of  A,.  Define  a  strategy  pair  s by 
stipulating  that  si takes the value Yi  or ti according  as to whether  A i does or does 
not  occur.  Then  s is uncorrelated  and satisfies (6.4). 
If h,(r,,  t2)  5  v, the  proof  is similar,  the  roles  of the  two  players  being  then 
reversed.  This  completes  the  proof  of Proposition  6.5. 
Proposition  6.5 fails if it  is only  assumed  that  there  is a  subjective  event  of 
which  at  least  one  player  is informed.  For  example,  if  in  the  2-person  O-sum 
game  with matrix 
1  1  ‘II 
------3 
2  0 
there  is a subjective  event  in 9,  but not in 9z,  then  there  is no pair  of strategies 
satisfying  (6.4).  In  this  game  it  is sufficient  for  (6.4) that  there  be  a  subjective 
event  in 9,.  In general,  the  proof  of Proposition  6.5 shows that  in any  specific 
game,  only  one player  need  use a subjective  strategy,  while the other  can use an 
objective  one;  but which player  it is that  uses the subjective  strategy  may depend 
on the  game. 
It is perhaps  worth  noting  that  in Proposition  6.5, the strategies  constituting  s 
may  be taken  to be independent;  indeed,  the strategies  constructed  in the proof 
are independent. 
7.  Proof  of  the  propositions  of  sect.  4 
We start  with a lemma  that  is basic to the proofs  in this section. 
(7.1)  Lemma.  Let  9  be  a  roulette,  and  let  B’,  . . ., B’  be  events.  Then for 
any  a between 0 and  1, there is an objective event in 9  with probability  a that  is 
independent of each of the B’. 
Proof.  Consider  the  (1 +&z-dimensional  vector  measure  p  on  (Q9p) 82  R.J.  Aumann, Randomized  strategies 
defined  by 
&t)  =  P,(A),  i=l  ,*..,n, 
pkn+i(A)  =  pi(A  n  Bk),  i =  1, . . ., n,  k  =  1, . . ., 1. 
That  p  is non-atomic  follows  from  the  non-atomicity  of  the  pi  on  3.  By  the 
theorem  of Lyapunov  (1940) on the range  of a vector  measure,  the  range  of p is 
convex.  Now 
and 
W)  =  (1, * * -5 1,P,(B’),  * - .PP”W),  - - .,Pi(N,  - - *,P,@‘N 
/J(0)  =  (0, . . ., 0). 
Hence  a,i@)  is in  the  range  of  p,  i.e.  there  is a  set  A in  W such  that  p(A)  = 
a,u(n).  This means that p’(A)  =  a for  all i and 
pi(A  n  Bk)  =  crpi(Bk) = pi(A 
for  all i. The  proof  of the lemma  is complete. 
Proof  of Lemma  4.1.  By induction  on the  number  m of members  si of Si for 
which  pi  >  0.  Let  W, be  the  i-secret  roulette  provided  by  Assumption  II. 
As  often  in the  case  of  inductive  proofs,  it is convenient  to  prove  a  somewhat 
stronger  statement  than  is needed;  here  we show that 
(7.2)  a  strategy  s1 can  be  chosen  obeying  Proposition  4.1,  so  that  the  events 
{si =  si} are in gi. 
If m =  1 there  is nothing  to prove.  Let m >  1, and suppose  the proposition  true 
for  m-l.  Let  Si  =  {.St,  . . ., Sy, . . .},  where  cr,(si) >  0  if  and  only  if j  5  m. 
By  the  induction  hypothesis,  there  are  disjoint  objective  events  B’,  . . ., Bmml 
such  that  p(Bj)  =  o,(s{)/(l  -ai($  By  Lemma  7.1 with  W =  pi,  there  is an 
objective  i-secret  event  B”  independent  of  each  of  B’,  . . ., B”-l,  such  that 
p(B”)  =  1 -a&$‘).  Set  A’  = Bj  n  B”  for  j  <  m,  A”  = QZ\Bm,  and  Ai  =  0 for 
j  >  m; then  A’ E Wi for  allj.  Define  si by si(w)  =  s{ if and  only  if w E Aj.  Then 
si satisfies (7.2). This  completes  the proof  of Lemma  4.1. 
Proof of Lemma  4.2.  Use Assumption  II, and apply  Lemma  7.1 with W =  Wi 
and  1 =  1. 
Before  proving  Proposition  4.3 we need  a lemma. 
(7.3)  Lemma.  Let  (sl,  . . ., s,,) be  an  n-tuple  of  strategies,  and  let  s E S.  For 
some i E N, suppose that all the sj exceptpossibily  si are mixed.  Then 
pi{s  =  S}  =  pi{Si  =  Si}pi(Sj  =  Sj  forallj  #  l} 
=  pi{S  =  Sl}  * a * pi(S,  =  S,}. R.J.  Aumann, Randomized  strategies  83 
Proof.  W.1.0.g. let i =  1, and let Aj  =  (Sj =  Sj} for allj;  then 
{s =  s} =  Al  n  . . . n  A,. 
Moreover,  A,  E 4,  and  Aj  E Yj  for j  >  1. By  definition  of  Sj,  each  Aj  with 
j  >  1 is l-independent  of A,+l  n  . . . n  A,.  Hence 
PI(AZ  n  a. . n  A,)  =  P~(&~P~(&  n  . . . n  -4,) 
=  *..  =  PI(A,)  . . . PI(AJ. 
Again  by  definition  of  ~j,  each  Aj  with  j  >  1  is  l-independent  of 
A,  n  A,  n  . . . n  Aj_ 1. Hence  by the precious  equation, 
pl(A,  n  A,  n  . . . n  -4)  =  pl(Al  n  A,  n  . . . n  An-ll~l(AJ 
=  . . .  =  ~k4l~~Gb).  . . pl(A,J  =  P,(A,~P,(-&  n  . . . n  A,). 
This  completes  the proof  of the lemma. 
(7.4.)  Corollary.  Let  (sl,  . . ., s,,) be  an  n-tuple  of  mixed  strategies.  Then  the 
si are independent. 
Proof  of Proposition 4.3.  Ifs  =  (sl , . . ., s,,) is an objective  mixed  equilibrium 
point,  then  for each strategy  ti of i, 
(7.5)  Hi(S)  2  Hi(Sl,...,Si-l,ti,Si+l,...,S,). 
In  particular,  this  holds  when  ii  is  itself  objective  and  mixed.  From  this  it 
follows  that  H(s) is a Nash  equilibrium  payoff. 
Conversely,  if F(a)  is a Nash  equilibrium  payoff,  then  from  Lemma  4.1 and 
Corollary  8.4 it  follows  that  there  is  an  n-tuple  s =  (sl,  . . ., s,)  of  objective 
mixed  strategies  with  payoff  F(a)  that  is in equilibrium  against  deviations  that 
are  restricted  to  objective  mixed  strategies;  i.e.  that  (7.5)  holds  when  ti  is an 
objective  mixed  strategy.  In particular  (7.5) holds  when  ti is ‘pure’, i.e. takes  on 
a particular  value in Si with probability  1. To show that  s is an equilibrium  in our 
sense, we must  show that  (7.5) holds when pi is any strategy  of i, i.e. that  i cannot 
‘correlate  into’  the  strategies  of  the  other  players.  Intuitively  this  follows  from 
the  fact  that  the  Sj are  mixed,  i.e.  pegged  on j-secret  events;  formally,  though, 
we must show that  our definition  of secrecy does indeed  yield this result. 
W.1.o.g. let  i =  1. Write  S’ =  S,  x . . . x S,,  and  s’ =  (sz,  . . ., s,). 
For  any s1 in S, , write 
H,(s,,  ~‘1 =  &(h(+  3  0). 
Since (7.5) holds when ti is ‘pure’, it follows  that for  all s1 E S, , 
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Then  for  an arbitrary  strategy  t,  of  1, it follows  from  Lemma  7.3 and  (7.6) that 
HI@, 2  4  =  2  PI #I  9  s’)  =  swc9 
Proof  of Lemma  4.4.  Apply  Lemma  7.1 with  1 =  1, taking  W to  be a public 
roulette. 
Proof  of Proposition  4.5.  We  first consider  the equilibrium  payoffs.  Let s and t 
be  equilibrium  points,  and  let  0  5  LY  5  1. Let  9%’  be  the  public  roulette.  By 
Lemma  7.1,  there  is  an  objective  event  A  in  W with  probability  a  that  is 
independent  of  all the  events  {s =  s> and  {t =  s} for  all s in  S. Now  let  each 
player  i play  the  strategy  Yi  defined  as follows:  if A occurs,  play  si ; if not,  play 
ti. In other  words,  i plays a given pure Si in Si if and only if the event 
(7.7)  [A n  {Si =  Si}]  U  [(R\A) CI {ti  =  Si}] 
occurs.  This  is indeed  a strategy,  since the event  (7.7) is in the a-field  9i.  It may 
then  be verified  that  r is an equilibrium  point  and that 
(4.12)  H(r)  =  aH(s)+(l-  cz)H(t), 
so the  set  of  equilibrium  payoffs  is convex.  The  proof  that  the  set  of  feasible 
payoffs  is convex  is similar,  so the proof  of Proposition  4.5 is complete. 
8.  A  posteriori  equilibria 
We would  like to  view an equilibrium  point  as a self-enforcing  agreement.  In 
the  scenario  described  in sect.  3, if the  players  agree  on  an  equilibrium  point  s 
before  stage  (ii) (the  stage at which  information  about  o  is received),  no  player 
will want  to  renege  [i.e. choose  a pure  strategy  other  than  si(o)]  after  stage  (ii). 
More  precisely,  when making the  agreement  each player  i assigns subjective  pro- 
bability  0  to  the  possibility  that  he  will  want  to  renege  after  receiving  his 
information. 
There  is,  however,  a  difficulty  here.  Though  the  subjective  probability  of 
wanting  to  renege  is 0, this possibility  is not  entirely  excluded;  more  important, 
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wanting  to  renege.  In  that  case  the  equilibrium  point  can  no  longer  be  considered 
self-enforcing;  the  possibility  of  somebody  wanting  to  renege  is  not  negligible. 
This  is  exactly  the  phenomenon  that  is  responsible  for  the  equilibrium  payoff 
of  (1,  1) in  Example  2.2. 
To  legitimize  the  view  of  an  equilibrium  point  as  a  self-enforcing  agreement, 
one  can  either 
(a)  make  assumptions  under  which  the  possibility  of  some  player  wanting  to 
renege  is assigned  probability  0 by  all  players;  or 
(b)  construct  a model  in  which  it is possible  to  define  equilibrium  points  at  which 
no  player  ever  wants  to  renege. 
Specifically,  we  may  assume  that  though  the  players  may  have  different  sub- 
jective  probabilities,  the  concept  of ‘impossible’  or  ‘negligible’  is the  same  for  all. 
That  is,  if p,(B)  =  0 for  one  i then  p,(B)  =  0 for  all  i; in  other  words,  the  pi  are 
absolutely  continuous  with  respect  to  each  other.  [For  the  case  of  two  players, 
this  is  the  same  as  (5.2).]  In  that  case,  the  possibility  that  any  player  will  want 
to  renege  is negligible  for  all  players,  and  so can  be  safely  ignored. 
Alternatively,  one  could  replace  the  concept  of  equilibrium  point  by  that  of 
‘a posteriori  equilibrium  point’  -  a  strategy  n-tuple  from  which  no  player  i ever 
wishes  to  move  (unilaterally),  even  after  receiving  his  information  about  nature’s 
choice  of  o.  Formally,  this  can  be  done  by  adding  the  following  to  the  7 items 
that  define  a game  (see  sect.  3). 
(8)  For  each  player  i and  each  o  in  Q,  a  relation  XT  on  the  space  of  lotteries 
on  X (the preference  order of i given his information about o). 
The  relations  &r  will  also  be  called  a posteriori  preferences.  An  a posteriori 
equilibrium point is  then  defined  to  be  an  n-tuple  s of  strategies  such  that  for  all 
o,  all  i, and  all  t i in  Si,  we have 
g(s)  XY g(sl  9 . . .T  si-l  3 si+l  9  *  *  *9 sn). 
Under  appropriate  assumptions  one  can  then  prove  the  following  results  : 
(8.1)  Theorem  5.1  holds  without  the  hypothesis  of  mutual  absolute  continuity 
(5.2),  if  ‘equilibrium  point’  is  replaced  by  ‘a posteriori  equilibrium  point’. 
(8.2)  If  all  the  pi  are  mutually  absolutely  continuous,  then  the  set  of  payoffs  to 
a  posteriori  equilibrium  points  coincides  with  the  set  of  payoffs  to  equi- 
librium  points. 
The  proof  of (8.1)  is like  the  proof  of Proposition  5.1,  except  that  a pure  strategy 
sij  is  now  said  to  ‘enter  actively’  into  the  strategy  si  if there  is some  o  for  which 
si(w)  =  sii,  even  if  i assigns  probability  0  to  the  set  of  all  such  o.  Note  that 
from  (8.1)  it  follows  that  (1,  1)  is  not  an  a  posteriori  equilibrium  payoff  in 
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One can  also prove  a posteriori  results  that  are analogous  to  Propositions  4.3 
and  4.5. 
A logically  complete  development  of the a posteriori  theory  involves  rewriting 
Assumptions  I and  II,  redefining  many  of the  concepts  defined  above  (such  as 
i-secrecy  and  mixed  strategy),  and  making  assumptions  that  relate  preferences 
to  a  posteriori  preferences.  ‘*  The  development  therefore  becomes  somewhat 
lengthy.  In view of result  (8.2), it does not  seem worthwhile,  at least at this stage, 
to impose  a formal  description  of the a posteriori  theory  on the reader. 
9.  Discussion 
a)  The  fact  that  differing  subjective  probabilities  can  yield  social  benefit  is 
perhaps  obvious.  Wagers  on  sporting  events,  stock  market  transactions,  etc., 
though  they  can  be  explained  by  convexities  in  utility  functions,  can  also  be 
explained  by differing  subjective  probabilities;  and  in reality,  the latter  explana- 
tion  is probably  at least  as significant  as the former.  Correlation  of strategies  is 
basically  also  a fairly  obvious  idea.  It is all the  more  surprising  that  these  ideas 
have  heretofore  not  been  more  carefully  studied  in game theory  in general,  and 
in the context  of randomization  in particular. 
b)  Our  more  substantive  results  can  be  broadly  divided  into  two  classes: 
Those  having  to do with equilibrium  points  (notably  Examples  2.2 through  2.9, 
and  Proposition  5.1),  and  those  having  to  do  with  feasible  points  (notably 
Example  2.1 and  Proposition  6.1). The  former  belong  to  the  ‘non-cooperative’ 
theory,  the latter  to the ‘cooperative’  theory.  An understanding  of this distinction 
rests  on an understanding  of the  concepts  of communication,  correlation,  com- 
mitment,  and contract.  Let us examine  these concepts  in the context  of this paper, 
noting  in particular  how they  are  related  to  ‘cooperative’  and ‘non-cooperative’ 
games. 
Recall  that  in  step  (ii) of  the  scenario  of  sect.  3,  each  player  i is  given  his 
information  about  nature’s  choice  of w. By communication  we mean  communica- 
tion  between  the  players  before  step  (ii). Strategies  of the  players  are  correlated 
if they  are  statistically  dependent.  A  commitment  is an irrevocable  undertaking 
on the part  of  a player,  entered  into  before  step  (ii), to  play  in accordance  with 
a  certain  strategy. l9  A  contract  (or  ‘binding  agreement’  or  ‘enforceable  agree- 
ment’)  is a  set  of  commitments  simultaneously  undertaken  by  several  players, 
each  player’s  undertaking  being in consideration  of those  of the others. 
leThe  a posteriori  preferences  of  player  i can  be  derived  from  his  a priori  preferences,  but 
(like  conditional  probabilities)  only  for  gi-almost  all  w.  Of  course,  as  we  saw  above,  it  is 
precisely  the  sets ofpi-measure  0 that  cause  the difficulty. 
IgOne  can  imagine  broader  meanings  for  the  word  ‘commitment’,  in which  the  undertaking, 
though  irrevocable,  need  not  be  to  play  in  accordance  with  a  certain  strategy.  For  example, 
it could  be to  play  in accordance  with  one  of a certain  set of strategies,  or it could  be contingent 
on  the  choice  of  w or  on  other  commitments.  We  have  not  found  it  necessary  to  complicate 
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Of  the  four  terms  just  introduced,  only  ‘correlation’  has  a formal  meaning  in 
the  framework  of  our  formal  model  (see  sect.  3, where  ‘uncorrelated’  is defined). 
The  other  three  refer  not  to  the  model  itself,  but  to  how  the  model  is  to  be 
interpreted. 
If the  players  can  enter  into  commitments  and  contracts,  we have  a cooperative 
game.  If  not,20  we have  a non-cooperative game.  Formally,  cooperative  and  non- 
cooperative  games  are  described  in  the  same  way,  namely  by  the  model  of sect.  3. 
The  difference  between  the  two  types  of  games  lies  not  in  the  formal  description 
itself,  but  in  what  we  have  to  say  about  it -what  kind  of  theorems  we  prove 
about  it. 
In  a  non-cooperative  game,  at  each  point  of  time,  each  player  acts  so  as  to 
maximize  his  utility  at  that  point  of time,  without  taking  previous  commitments 
into  account.  Therefore  the  only  strategy  n-tuples  of interest  are  those  that  are  in 
equilibrium  (cf.  sect.  8). On  the  other  hand,  in  the  cooperative  theory  the  players 
can  enter  into  binding  agreements  before  step  (ii);  therefore  a  strategy  n-tuple 
does  not  have  to  be  in  equilibrium  to  be  of  interest,  and  one  is  led  to  study  all 
feasible  n-tuples. 
In  sect.  8  we  saw  that  equilibrium  points  can  be  viewed  as  self-enforcing 
agreements.  This  is  to  be  contrasted  with  feasible  points  that  are  not  in  equili- 
brium;  if  the  players  agree  before  step  (ii)  of  the  scenario  to  play  such  a  point, 
some  of  them  will  wish  to  renege  after  step  (ii).  Therefore  a  contract  -  and  an 
external  enforcement  mechanism  -  are  required  to  make  such  agreements  stick. 
Thus  we  see that  both  the  non-cooperative  and  the  cooperative  theory  involve 
agreement  among  the  players,  the  difference  being  only  in  that  in  one  case  the 
agreement  is  self-enforcing,  whereas  in  the  other  case  it  must  be  externally 
enforced.  Agreement  usually  involves  communication,  so  that  we  conclude  that 
communication  normally  takes  place  in  non-cooperative  as  well  as  cooperative 
games. 
As  for  correlation,  this  is sometimes  taken  as a hallmark  of cooperative  games. 
In  our  view,  this  is  a fallacy;  correlation  may  or  may  not  be  possible  in  a given 
game,  whether  or  not  it  is  cooperative.  Examples  2.4  through  2.9  show  that 
correlation  may  be  involved  in  agreements  that  are  not  enforceable  but  are  self- 
enforcing,  so  that  it  can  be  significant  even  in  a  non-cooperative  game.  On  the 
other  hand,  even  in  a  cooperative  game  it  may  be  impossible  to  correlate,  for 
example  because  the  players  are  in  different  places  and  cannot  observe  the  same 
random  events;  but  nevertheless  they  can  negotiate  and  even  execute  a contract, 
for  example  by  mail. 
Equilibrium  points  can  be  viewed  in  ways  other  than  as  self  enforcing  agree- 
ments.  For  example,  they  can  be  viewed  as  strategy  n-tuples  with  the  property 
that  if,  for  some  extraneous  reason,  they  ‘come  to  the  fore’  or  are  suggested  to 
the  players,  there  will  be  no  tendency  to  move  away  from  them.  Alternatively, 
“‘These  are  the  two extremes.  In  many  situations,  some  commitments  and  contracts  are 
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they  can  be  viewed  as  providing  only  a  necessary  condition  for  a  satisfactory 
theory  of non-cooperative  games  : if a theory  is to  ‘recommend’  a specific  strategy 
to  each  player,  then  the  n-tuple  of  the  recommended  strategies  must  be  in 
equilibrium.  To  make  sense,  these  points  of  view  do  not  require  pre-play  com- 
munication.  But  even  without  communication,  correlation  is  by  no  means  ruled 
out.  Thus  in  Example  2.4,  the  payoff  (3/2,  3/2)  is  no  more  the  result  of  com- 
munication  than  the  payoff  (2,  1). All  that  is  needed  to  achieve  (3/2,  3/2)  is that 
a  fair  coin  be  tossed,  or  a  similar  random  device  be  actuated,  and  that  the  out- 
come  be  communicated  to  both  players  before  the  beginning  of  play.  If  that  is 
done,  the  payoff  (3,2,  3/2)  becomes  a  full-fledged  equilibrium  payoff,  con- 
ceptually  indistinguishable  from  (2,l);  and  that  is  so  even  in  the  absence  of 
communication. 
Of course,  communication  may  be important  to choose  a particular  equilibrium 
point  from  among  all  those  whose  payoff  is (3/2,  3/2).  But  the  problem  of choos- 
ing  a  particular  equilibrium  point  has  nothing  to  do  with  correlation  -  it  exists 
in  most  non-cooperative  games.  Thus  in  example  2.4,  even  without  the  oppor- 
tunity  for  correlation,  it  is  difficult  to  see why  one  equilibrium  point  rather  than 
another  should  be  chosen.  This,  incidentally,  is one  reason  for  preferring  to  view 
an  equilibrium  point  as a self-enforcing  agreement. 
Finally,  a  word  about  the  distinction  between  ‘commitment’  and  ‘contract’. 
Unlike  a  contract,  a  commitment  is  an  individual  undertaking;  it  may,  for 
example,  consist  of  giving  irreversible  instructions  to  an  agent  or  a  machine  to 
act  in  accordance  with  a given  randomized  strategy,  or  it  may  involve  an  obliga- 
tion  to  pay  a large  indemnity  if one  does  not  act  in  accordance  with  this  strategy. 
If  there  is  no  such  agent  or  machine,  or  nobody  to  enforce  collection  of  the 
indemnity,  it  may  be  impossible  to  undertake  commitments,  and  we  will  have  a 
non-cooperative  game.  Commitments  are  important  in  game  theory  even  when 
contracts  are  impossible  [see  for  example  Aumann  and  Maschler  (1972)]. 
However,  when  it  is  possible  to  make  commitments  as  well  as  to  communicate, 
it  should  usually  be  possible  to  make  contracts  as well.  Moreover,  by  permitting 
commitments  one  opens  the  door  to  pre-emptive  tactics  (such  as  threats)  in  the 
pre-play  stage,  which  may  easily  lead  the  outcome  away  from  equilibrium.  Thus 
we  feel  that  when  one  has  admitted  commitments,  one  has  already  gone  much 
of  the  way  from  the  non-cooperative  to  the  cooperative  theory. 
To  sum  up:  The  cooperative  theory  requires  communication  as  well  as  com- 
mitment  and  contracting  power;  and  it  is  a  priori  concerned  with  all  feasible 
outcomes.  The  non-cooperative  theory  requires  that  there  be  neither  commit- 
ment  nor  contracting  power,  but  it  permits  communication;  and  it  is  concerned 
with  equilibrium  outcomes.  Both  theories  can  accommodate  correlation,  but  do 
not  require  its  presence. 
c)  It  is  interesting  that  those  of  our  results  that  belong  to  the  ‘cooperative’ 
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considered  the  epitome  of  non-cooperative  games;  it has  been  asserted  that  such 
a  game  can  only  be  played  non-cooperatively,  since  it  can  never  be  worthwhile 
to  reach  an  agreement  concerning  it.  Our  results  show  that  this  is  incorrect. 
It  is  not  true  that  a  2-person  O-sum  game  is  strictly  competitive,  i.e.  that  the 
preferences  of  the  players  are  always  in  direct  opposition;2’  both  players  can 
gain  by  the  use  of  a binding  agreement.  Thus  2-person  O-sum  games  can  profit- 
ably  be  played  cooperatively. 
On  the  other  hand,  when  correlation  is ruled  out,  the  introduction  of subjective 
strategies  creates  no  new  equilibrium  payoffs  [see  (5.1)].  This  indicates  that 
subjectivity  alone  (without  correlation)  at  least  does  not  affect  the  non- 
cooperative  theory  of  2-person  O-sum  games.  However,  we  must  be  careful 
before  reaching  even  this  modest  conclusion.  The  arguments  for  the  use  of 
minimax  strategies,  as  presented  by  von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern  (1953),  are 
of  two  kinds  : the  equilibrium  arguments,  which  they  ($17.3)  call  ‘indirect’,  and 
what  they  ($14,  §17.4-  $17.8)  call  ‘direct’  arguments.22  The  indirect  or  equili- 
brium  arguments  are  of  course  not  affected  by  the  introduction  of  subjectivity. 
But  it  is  the  direct  arguments  that  have  traditionally  been  used  to  support  the 
contention  that  the  theory  of  2-person  O-sum  games  is  conceptually  more 
satisfactory  than  that  of  more  general  games.  To  a  certain  extent,  these  direct 
arguments  are  affected;  implicitly,  they  depend  on  the  strictly  competitive 
character  of the  game,  which  as  we know  is removed  by  subjectivity. 
d)  It  must  be  stressed  that  the  chance  elements  of  our  model-  the  space 
(Q  g)  and  the  cr-fields  si  -  are  used  for  purposes  of  randomization  only. 
Nature’s  choice  of  a  point  w  in  Q  does  not  directly  affect  the  outcome  of  the 
game;  the  outcome  function  g  does  not  depend  on  w.  This  model  is  therefore 
quite  different  from  extensive  game  models  in  which  chance  makes  ‘moves’  that 
affect  the  outcome;  here  chance  is  only  ‘made  available’  to  the  players  for 
purposes  of  randomization.  [See  also  subsection  g) below.] 
e)  Our  use  of  the  terms  ‘subjective’  and  ‘objective’  is  a  little  different  from 
the  usual.  The  term  ‘subjective’  often  signifies  a  personalistic  definition  of 
probability,  based  on  preferences,  such  as  that  of  Savage  (1954),  whereas 
‘objective’  signifies  a  physical  (i.e.  frequency)  definition.23  This  is not  the  dis- 
tinction  being  made  here.  Here  the  distinction  is  based  solely  on  whether  the 
players  in  the  game  do  or  do  not  agree  about  the  numerical  value  of  the 
probability  in  question.24 
z’Nevertheless,  even  after  the  introduction  of  subjective  strategies,  the  game  remains 
‘almost  strictly  competitive’  in the sense  of Aumann  (1961). 
22These are called  ‘guaranteed  value arguments’  by Aumann  and  Maschler  (1972). 
‘%f.  Anscombe  and  Aumann  (1963), where  personalistic  and  frequency  probabilities  were 
called  ‘probability’  and  ‘chance’  respectively. 
z4The  fact  that  they  may  disagree  forces  us to adopt  a personalistic  definition  of probability 
for  at  least  some  events;  but  there  is nothing  to  prevent  us from  adopting  a physical  definition 
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f)  In  this  paper  we have  extended  the  theory  of games  in  strategic  (i.e.  normal) 
form  by  the  consideration  of  subjective  events.  A  parallel  extension  is  possible 
for  the  theory  of  games  in  extensive  form.  Basically,  such  an  extension  would 
consist  of  replacing  the  probabilities  now  appearing  in  the  extensive  form 
[Kuhn  (1953)]  on  chance  moves  by  vectors  of probabilities,  with  one  component 
for  each  player.  The  definition  of  ‘strategy’  remains  unchanged;  the  definition  of 
‘payoff’  is modified  only  in  that  one  uses  the  different  probabilities  on  the  chance 
moves  in  calculating  the  payoffs  for  the  different  players.  It  may  be  verified  that 
the  basic  theorems  [Kuhn  (1953)]  of extensive  game  theory  -  namely  the  theorem 
on  pure  strategy  equilibrium  points  in  games  of  perfect  information,  and  on 
behavior  strategies  in  games  of perfect  recall  -  go  through  in  this  case  as well. 
One  immediate  application  of  this  remark  is  to  the  theory  of  Harsanyi  (1967, 
1968)  of  games  of  incomplete  information.  Harsanyi  has  shown  that  in  what  he 
calls  the  ‘consistent  case’,  a  game  of  incomplete  information  in  strategic  form 
corresponds  to  a  certain  game  of  complete  information  in  extensive  form.  In 
the  ‘inconsistent  case’,  there  is no  such  correspondence.  However,  if one  extends 
the  definition  of extensive  games  in  the  way  indicated  above,  then  the  inconsistent 
case  can  be  taken  care  of in  essentially  the  same  way  as the  consistent  case. 
g)  An  alternative  approach  to  that  of  this  paper  would  be  to  introduce  the 
possibilities  for  correlation  and  subjective  randomization  explicitly  into  the 
extensive  form  of  the  game.  This  would  mean  starting  the  game  with  chance’s 
choice  of  a  point  in  0,  and  then  giving  each  player  i that  information  which  is 
‘his’  in  accordance25  with  the  o-field  9i.  The  strategic  form  of  this  enlarged 
game  could  be  calculated  as  indicated  under  f)  above;  the  Nash  equilibrium 
points  of  the  enlarged  game  correspond  to  the  equilibrium  points,  as  defined  in 
this  paper,  of  the  original  game.  Thus  in  the  appropriate  context,  our  equi- 
librium  points  are  special  cases  of  Nash  equilibrium  points.  One  difficulty  with 
this  approach  is  that  it  would  lead  to  an  infinite  extensive  game,  since  IR is 
infinite.  But  this  is  by  no  means  an  insuperable  difficulty;  models  have  been 
studied  that  are  entirely  adequate  to  cover  such  a  situation  [Aumann  (1964)]. 
We  did  not  construct  our  model  in  this  way  for  a number  of reasons.  First,  none 
of the  examples  or  propositions  would  have  been  simplified  by  such  a procedure; 
on  the  contrary,  the  extensive  form  is clumsy  to  work  with,  and  the  mathematical 
treatment  would  presumably  have  been  more  complex.  Second,  one  usually 
thinks  of the  extensive  form  as representing  the  originally  given  rules  of the  game. 
in  which  the  two  kinds  of probability  exist  side  by side,  have  been  investigated;  cf.  Anscombe 
and  Aumann  (1963).  On  the  other  hand,  a purely  personalistic  view,  such  as  Savage’s,  is also 
perfectly  satisfactory  for  the  purposes  of  this  paper.  Incidentally,  if  one  does  adopt  such  a 
purely  personalistic  view,  then  an  a  priori  assumption  on  the  existence  of  objective  roulette 
wheels  loses  its  intuitive  attractiveness;  thus  the  fact  that  Lemmas  4.1  and  4.2  follow  from 
Assumption  II gains  in significance  (see the  discussion  after  the  statement  of Lemma  4.2). 
ZSThe  information  sets  of  i  immediately  after  chance’s  choice  would  be  those  subsets  B 
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In that  case extraneous  random  events,  which  do not  directly  affect  the outcome 
of the game,  do not  belong  in the extensive  form, - one does not  introduce  all the 
possibilities  for  objective  mixing  explicitly  into  the  game  either  [see subsect. e) 
above]. 
II 
0.0  0.0 
Original  game 
chance 
2,1  0.0  o,o  12  ZJ 
Modified  game 
Fig.  1 
w  0.0  12 
h)  It  is  nevertheless  useful  to point  out  how  some  of our  examples  involving 
correlation  look  in  an  extensive  framework.  Example  2.4 may  be  restated  as 
follows:  Suppose  we add  a move  at the  beginning  of the game  in which  chance 
simply  announces  the results  of a coin toss;  no other  change is made in the game 
(see  fig.  1).  One  would  have  thought  that  this  could  not  possibly  effect  an 
essential  change  in the game.  But in the classical theory  of Nash  (1951), it does; 
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before.  Similarly  if  chance  announces  the  result  of  a  roulette  spin,  every  point 
in  the  interval  connecting  (2,  1) to  (1,2!  becomes  an  equilibrium  payoff,  whereas 
of  these  points,  only  the  end  points  were  equilibrium  payoffs  before.  As  we  said 
in  sect.  2,  all  this  appears  already  in  Harsanyi  and  Selten  (1972).  But  examples 
2.5  and  2.6  can  be  treated  in  a  similar  manner.  Here  one  must  add  a  move  in 
which  chance  tosses  a fair  coin  and  informs  players  1 and  2 -but  not  player  3 - 
of the  outcome.  Again,  one  would  have  thought  that  the  addition  of  such  a move 
could  not  possibly  affect  the  game  in  any  essential  manner.  But  it  adds  a  Nash 
equilibrium  point  with  payoff  (2,2,2),  whereas  in  the  original  game  no  player 
could  get  more  than  1 at  any  Nash  equilibrium  point.  Examples  2.7 and  2.8  may 
be  treated  similarly. 
i)  The  phenomena  in  Examples  2.1  and  2.3,  which  are  the  basic  examples 
regarding  subjective  probabilities,  do  not  depend  on  each  player  knowing  the 
other  players’  subjective  probabilities  precisely.  Thus  in  Example  2.1,  it  is 
sufficient  that  both  players  know  that  players  1 and  2 ascribe  to  D probabilities 
that  are  >  l/2  and  <  l/2  respectively;  in  that  case  it  will  already  be  worthwhile 
to  enter  into  a  binding  agreement.  A  similar  remark  holds  for  Example  2.3,  in 
which  it  is  sufficient  that  players  1 and  2  ascribe  to  D  subjective  probabilities 
that  are  approximately  314 and  l/4  respectively  (the  precise  limits  of the  approxi- 
mation  are  easily  calculated). 
Of  course  there  is  no  particular  reason  to  treat  subjective  probabilities 
differently  from  utilities  -  if  we  assume  that  the  players’  utilities  are  known  to 
each  other,  we  may  as well  assume  the  same  for  the  subiective  probabilities.  The 
above  remark  only  points  out  that  precise  knowledge  is  not  crucial.  Situations 
in  which  the  players’  utilities  and/or  subiective  probabilities  are  not  known  to 
each  other  can  be  treated  by  the  methods  of  games  of  incomplete  information 
[Harsanyi  (1967,  1968)]. 
j)  The  view  is  sometimes  held  that  when  people  have  different  subjective 
probabilities  for  the  same  event,  this  can  only  be  due  to  differences  in  the 
information  available  to  these  people.  Such  a view  has  been  eloquently  set  forth 
by  John  Harsanyi  (1968,  §16),  and  we will  call  it the  Hurwzyi  doctrine.  Suppose, 
for  example,  that  players  1  and  2  have  subjective  probabilities  2/3  and  l/3 
respectively  that  a given  horse  A  will  run  faster  than  another  horse  B in  a given 
race.  One  could  simply  say  that  the  subjective  probabilities  are  different  and 
leave  it  at  that.  But  one  could  also  imagine  that  both  players  previously  had  a 
uniform  prior  on  the  probability  p  that  A  beats  B;  that  1 had  seen  A  beat  B in 
one  race,  and  2 had  seen  B beat  A  in  another  race.  Harsanyi’s  view  is that  differ- 
ences  in  subjective  probabilities  can  always  be  accounted  for  in  such  a fashion.26 
The  holders  of  such  a  view  would  probably  consider  the  approach  of  this 
26Though  Harsanyi  (1968)  does  not  state  this  position  in  such  absolute  terms,  there  is 
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paper  invalid.  Suppose  that  in  Example  2.1,  D  is the  event  ‘horse  A  beats  horse 
B’.  Suppose  further  that  each  player  knows  that  the  other  has  observed  exactly 
one  previous  race.  Now  in  our  context  we  assume  that  each  player  knows  the 
other’s  probability  for  D.  But  in  that  case,  the  very  knowledge  of  the  other 
player’s  probability  will  cause  revision  of  each  player’s  own  probability.  The 
result  of  this  revision  will  necessarily  be  p,(D)  =  p,(D)  =  l/2,  so  that  the 
previously  ‘subjective’  probabilities  become  ‘objective’. 
But  there  is  also  another  possibility,  namely  that  each  player  has  made 
several  observations,  and  that  these  observations  lead  the  players  to  assign 
probabilities  213  and  l/3  respectively  to  D.  For  example,  213  would  be 
the  result  of  3 wins  for  A  and  1 win  for  B,  as  well  as  1 win  for  A  only.  Though 
the  players  may  know  each  other’s  probability,  they  may  not  know  on  precisely 
what  observations  it  is  based.  Thus  each  player  would  not  know  if  his  own 
information  is  or  is  not  more  reliable  than  the  other  player’s,  and  might  be 
inclined  to  stick  with  his  own  information.  Of  course  some  revision  of  proba- 
bilities  would  certainly  be  called  for  even  in  such  a  case;  but  whether  such  a 
revision  must  always  ultimately  lead  to  equal  probabilities  for  D is not  clear. 
In  any  event,  under  the  Harsanyi  doctrine  cases  of  differing  subjective 
probabilities  known  to  ail  players  either  do  not  occur,  or  if  they  do  occur,  they 
should  be  treated  by  the  methods  of games  of incomplete  information.  Basically, 
therefore,  that  part  of this  paper  dealing  with  subjective  randomization  assumes 
that  different  people  can  have  irreconcilable  priors  -  precisely  what  Harsanyi 
calls  the  ‘inconsistent  case’.  Most  workers  in  the  field  wouid  probably  agree  that 
the  inconsistent  case  can  occur,  and  we  are  perfectly  willing  to  let  our  contribu- 
tion  stand  or  fall  on  this  basis. 
But  there  is  also  another  argument  for  our  theory,  an  argument  based  on 
Savage’s  ‘Small  Worlds’  theme  (1954,  $2.5 and  $5.5).  Suppose  we  are  faced  with 
a game  like  that  in  Example  2.1  or  2.3,  and  wish  to  apply  the  Harsanyi  doctrine; 
this  leads  to  an  analysis  by  means  of the  theory  of games  of incomplete  informa- 
tion.  Now  such  an  analysis  will  in  general  involve  an  enormous  expansion  of the 
formal  description  of the  game.  It  may  be  necessary  to  use  a population  of many 
millions  of  types  for  each  of  the  2  or  3 players.”  The  resulting  game  will  in 
practice  be  completely  unanalyzable.  We  suggest  that  an  equally  valid  practice 
would  be  to  accept  apparent  differences  in  subjective  probabilities  at  their  face 
value,  even  if one  adheres  to  the  Harsanyi  doctrine. 
This  question  is  not  too  different  from  the  question  ‘What  is  an  outcome? 
(cf.  Savage,  op.  cit.).  Suppose  we  are  playing  a  given  matrix  game  for  money. 
The  normal  procedure  would  be  to  assign  utilities  to  the  amounts  of  money 
involved,  and  then  solve  the  game  using  any  of the  standard  theories.  But  a sum 
of  money  is not  in  itself  valuable;  it  depends  on  how  one  wishes  to  use  it.  So  to 
analyze  the  game  properly  we would  have  to  decide  on  how  to  invest  the  money 
27‘  . . . eoery possible combination  of attributes  . . . will be represented in this population  . . .’ 
[Harsanyi (1968, p. 176) italics in the original]. 
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or  what  consumer  article  to  buy  with  it.  But  even  the  investment  or  the  con- 
sumer  article  itself  is  often  only  a  means  to  an  end;  and  this  ‘end’  in  turn,  is 
often  again  largely  a means.  Following  through  all  this  in  a formal  fashion,  even 
if  it  were  theoretically  possible,  would  make  the  simplest  of  games  totally  un- 
manageable.  So  one  isolates  the  given  game  as  a  ‘small  world’,  using  the  utilities 
to  sum  up  all  that  follows.  We  suggest  that  even  if  in  principle  one  accepts  the 
Harsanyi  doctrine,  one  can  live  with  differing  subjective  probabilities  as  a 
summation  of  the  complex  informational  situation  in  which  the  players  find 
themselves. 
k)  We  end  this  paper  with  a discussion  of  two  possible  objections  that  could 
be  raised  against  the  idea  of  subjective  strategies.  To  fix  ideas,  consider  the 
situation  of two  politicians,  Adams  and  Brown,  running  for  the  office  of  mayor 
of their  town.  Each  one  has  a number  of (pure)  campaign  strategies  open  to  him. 
Each  pair  of  such  strategies  yields  a  probability  for  the  election  of  Adams,  the 
complementary  probability  being  that  of  the  election  of  Brown;  for  simplicity, 
assume  that  these  probabilities  are  objective.  This  is  a  classical  example  of  a 
constant-sum  game,  since  there  are  only  two  possible  final  outcomes;  the  utilities 
of  Adams  and  Brown  may  thus  be  taken  equal  to  the  respective  success  proba- 
bilities,  and  the  sum  is therefore  always  constant  ( =  1). 
What  is  now  being  suggested  is  that  Adams  and  Brown  use  randomized 
campaign  strategies  that  are  pegged  on  events  for  which  they  have  different 
subjective  probabilities.  These  events  may  be  entirely  disconnected  with  the 
political  campaign  in  question;  to  take  an  extreme  example,  if the  candidates  are 
Americans,  they  may  peg  their  choices  on  the  outcome  of  a  cricket  match  in 
England. 
One  objection  that  may  be  raised  to  this  procedure  is  that  whereas  a prudent 
person  might  be  willing  to  use  mixed  strategies  based  on  a coin  toss  with  known 
objective  probabilities,  he  would  hesitate  to  risk  his  career  on  the  outcome  of  an 
event  of which  he  knows  little  or  nothing.  Adams  and/or  Brown  may  know  little 
or  nothing  about  cricket  in  England;  how  can  we  suggest  that  they  peg  their 
decisions  on  it? 
Though  this  objection  has  great  intuitive  force,  it  is  not  consistent  with  the 
theory  of subjective  probability.  According  to  this  theory,  people  have  subjective 
probabilities  for  any  event,  no  matter  how  well  or  ill  they  are  informed  about  it; 
of course  the  probability  will  depend  on  the  available  information,  but  there  will 
always  be a probability.  Once  this  probability  is determined,  it enters  the  decision- 
making  process  in  all  respects  like  an  objective  probability.  A  certain  amount  of 
introspection  will,  moreover,  support  the  conclusions  of  the  theory  despite  their 
apparent  strangeness.  Suppose  Adams  is  asked  to  choose  between  winning  the 
election  with  objective  probability  l/3  and  winning  the  election  if the  Manchester 
cricket  team  beats  the  Liverpool  team.  If  he  knows  nothing  at  all  about  the 
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well choose  the  second  possibility,  despite  -  or  rather  because  of - his  lack  of 
information.  The  same point  may  similarly  be made  by considering  the situation 
in which  it is not  a pre-determined  coin  that  is tossed,  but  rather  a biassed  coin 
that  is picked  out  of a hat with a wide distribution  of biasses;  in such a situation, 
the  utility  theory  of  von  Neumann  and  Morgenstern  (1953)  still  applies, 
although  in a certain  sense the user knows  much  less about  the coin. 
1) Another  possible  objection  runs  as follows:  Both  players  realize  that  the 
game  is basically  zero  sum,  since in the  last  analysis,  only  one  of them  can  win 
the  election.  Both  know  it is an illusion  to  think  that  both  can  gain more  than 
the value  of the game;  this illusion  is based  on what  might  be called  a mistaken 
appraisal  of  probabilities  by  at  least  one  of  them  (and  possibly  both).  Would 
they  not  be more  prudent,  then,  to  guarantee  to  themselves  the  objective  value 
of  this  game  by  the  use  of  objectively  randomized  strategies,  thus  avoiding  all 
possible  ‘mistakes’ ? 
On  one  level,  this  question  can  be answered  simply  by  saying  that  each  side 
is here  taking  advantage  of what it sees as the other  side’s mistake,  and that  this 
is  perfectly  rational.  On  a  deeper  level,  though,  it  is  incorrect  to  speak  of 
‘mistakes’ at all. Each  side has well-defined  systems of preferences,  each perfectly 
consistent  in  itself,  and  these  preferences  are  not  directly  opposed.  Thus,  it  is 
incorrect  to  say  that  the  situation  is  ‘basically  zero  sum’.  This  situation  is 
analogous  to  a situation  in which  the  players’  preferences  as between  pure  out- 
comes  are  directly  opposed,  though  between  mixtures  of  outcomes  they  may 
not  be;  such a game is not  usually  called  zero-sum  or even ‘strictly  competitive’. 
Consider,  for example,  the game 
L  R 
I  I 
Preference-wise,  this  matrix  has  a  saddle  point  at  (T,  R).  It  is,  however,  not 
constant  sum,  since  a  contract  to  play  (T,  L)  and  (B, R)  with  probability  l/2 
each  is preferred  by  both  players  to  the  saddle  point.  Rather  than  signing  the 
contract  before  tossing  a coin,  one could  imagine  that  the coin has already  been 
tossed,  but  that  the  players  are  not  informed  of  the  outcome.  Paralleling  the 
above  argument,  one  could  then  say that  both  players  realize  that  the  game  is 
‘basically  strictly  competitive’,  since the  preferences  as between  pure  outcomes 
are directly  opposed.  Thus both  know that  it is an illusion  to think  that  both  can 
gain more  than  the 2 units  assigned  at the saddle point;  this illusion  is based  on 
a  mistaken  appraisal  of  how  the  coin  actually  fell.  Would  they  not  be  more 
prudent  to guarantee  a sure payoff  of at least 2? 
Certainly  if they  knew how the coin fell, there  would  be no point  in using it to 
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mix  outcomes;  but  in the  current  situation,  they  both  prefer  the  l/2-1/2  com- 
bination  of (5”,  L) and (B, R) to the  saddle  point  (T, R). This  agreement  is there- 
fore  a  perfectly  natural  one  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  one  of  the  players  must 
necessarily  lose  out.  Completely  similar  reasoning  holds  in the  case  of  a game 
that  is zero-sum  in  utilities,  but  that  can  be  made  non-strictly  competitive  by 
the  appropriate  use of subjectively  randomized  strategies. 
References 
Anscombe,  F.J.  and  R.J.  Aumamr,  1963, A  definition  of  subjective  probability,  Ann.  Math. 
Stat.  34,210-212. 
Aumann,  R.J.,  1961, Almost  strictly  competitive  games,  J. Sot.  Ind.  Appl.  Math.  9,544-550. 
Aumann,  R.J.,  1964, Mixed  and  behavior  strategies  in infinite  extensive  games,  in:  M. Dresher, 
L.S.  Shapley  and  A.W.  Tucker,  eds.,  Advances  in game  theory  (Princeton  University  Press, 
Princeton)  627-650. 
Aumann,  R.J.  and  M.  Maschler,  1972, Some  thoughts  on  the  minimax  principle,  Management 
Science  18, P-54-P-63. 
Harsanyi,  J.,  1967-68,  Games  of incomplete  information  played  by Bayesian  players,  Parts  I- 
III,  Management  Science  14,159-182,320-334,486502. 
Harsanyi,  J. and  R.  Selten,  1972, A generalized  Nash  solution  for  two-person  bargaining  games 
with  incomplete  information,  Management  Science  18, P-80-P-106. 
Kuhn,  H.W.,  1953,  Extensive  games  and  the  problem  of  information,  in:  H.W.  Kuhn  and 
A.W.  Tucker,  eds.,  Contributions  to  the  theory  of  games  II  (Princeton  University  Press, 
Princeton)  193-216. 
Lyapunov,  A.,  1940,  Sur  les  fonctions-vecteurs  completement  additives,  Bull.  Acad.  Sci. 
USSR  Ser.  Math.  4,465-478. 
Nash,  J.F.,  1951, Non-cooperative  games,  Ann.  of Math.  54,286-295. 
Savage,  L.J.,  1954, The foundations  of statistics  (John  Wiley,  New  York). 
Von  Neumann,  J.  and  0.  Morgenstem,  1944,  Theory  of  games  and  economic  behavior 
(Princeton  University  Press,  Princeton);  3rd ed.,  1953. 